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I. The problem
In his well known article, "What's it like to be a bat?", Thomas Nagel 
demonstrates the difficulties involved in understanding the subjective 
experiences of creatures that share few obvious conceptual starting points 
with human beings. Although we might try imagining ourselves in a bat's 
world, hanging upside down, perceiving the world by écholocation, and eating 
insects, we will be limited by our very conceptual framework, sensory 
apparatus, and the language of our thoughts. Even if I could mimic a bat's 
behavior and perceive through its sensory mechanism, the results would most 
likely, as Nagel puts it, "tell me only what it would be like for me to behave as a 
bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a 
bat to be a bat."l This same question of what it is like to think like an animal 
arises in several ancient models of mind.
Do animals and human beings think alike? Xenophanes tells us that if 
animals could represent the gods artistically, their gods would take the form 
and shape of animals (B15). Heraclitus emphasize how alien animal values and 
behavior are to human beings: donkeys prefer refuse to gold, sows enjoy filth 
more than pure water, and that animals must be driven to pasture by blows 
(B9, 13, 11). Pythagoras and Empedocles see an eschatological link between 
animal and human minds by means of their theory of metempsychosis. ^  The 
issue of animal minds, however, became more explicit (and more serious) in 
the epistemologies and psychological works of Aristotle and the Stoics. In this 
paper, I shall reexamine the Stoic position on this question, particularly in 
light of Richard Sorabji's recent criticisms of the so-called traditional view.3
Sorabji is concerned with a view common in the literature regarding 
the status of animal perception and thought attributed to the Stoics. He is 
especially concerned since this view is "likely to become an orthodoxy."^ This 
view, defended by scholars such as Frede, Inwood, Long and Sedley, and 
Labarrière, states that for the Stoics human thought is defined as being 1234
1 Nagel (1974), p.439.
2 If the theory of metempsychosis is true then Nagel's claim is invalidated. We 
could in fact know what it is like to be something by accessing the memory. 
Who knows? He may have been a bat in a previous incarnation. I will not be 
entertaining metempsychosis as a legitimate candidate for the solution to the 
problem of animal minds in this paper.
3 Sorabji (1990) and more recently (1993), pp. 20-28.
4 Sorabji (1990), p. 307.
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propositional in nature, whereas animal thought takes a non-propositional 
form. This contrast between propositional and non-propositional thinking is 
sometimes described as the difference between "thinking that" as opposed to 
"thinking as."
Sorabji points out that there is no such clear distinction between 
"thinking that" and "thinking as" in Stoic texts. In fact he is doubtful whether 
there is such "a neat distinction" between "that" and "as" for us.5 67 Sorabji's 
greatest concern, however, is that if the Stoics did teach that animals think 
non-propositionally, it would mean that animals do not have beliefs, and 
consequently the Stoics would not be able to provide a reasonable account of 
much of animal behavior.
For an animal to act upon a stimulus it is necessary that the animal 
think that the stimulus is of a certain kind, quality, or nature. The dog must 
believe that the hare is food (or tasty) if it is to go to the trouble to chase it 
down. Since it seems necessary for animals to hold beliefs and hence 
propositions, Sorabji must come up with an alternative way to distinguish 
animal and human thinking. He agues that both rational animals (human 
beings and gods) and non-rational animals possess propositional attitudes. 
Human beings, however, have the additional faculty of drawing inferences 
from signs. We can rationally manipulate propositions and make inferences 
from our beliefs; animals can form them, act upon them, and even demonstrate 
limited analogous behavior (see Chrysippus' dialectical dog) but they cannot 
truly make rational inferences.
Did the Stoics deny animals propositional attitudes? Despite Sorabji's 
concerns, I argue that indeed they did. Sorabji asks "whether we should 
compare the Stoics with Donald Davidson or Daniel Dennett?" He chooses 
Dennett. I will defend a modified version of the orthodox view that leans 
toward Davidson's approach while remaining faithful to the surviving 
evidence.
At this point I should add that I am not alone in a number of my 
concerns and criticisms of Richard Sorabji's solution to the problem of animal 
minds. I first published my criticisms of Sorabji in my 1997 dissertation. 6 I 
delighted to see that Glen Lesses, in his 1998 article "Content, Cause, and Stoic 
Impressions," came to very similar conclusions regarding objections to 
Sorabji's argument. The main difference between our positions is not so much 
the recognition of problems with Sorabji's argument. Rather, we differ 
primarily regarding the actual solution to the problem of if and how it would 
be possible to explain the most elementary forms of animal behavior without 
appealing to propositional attitudes. Lesses supports a version of the orthodox 
position in which he distinguishes the thinking processes of rational and 
non-rational animals on the basis of the scope of perceptual content. As 
Sorabji predicted Lesses found himself compelled to acknowledge that the Stoic 
position "might turn out muddled" and that perhaps the Stoics "did not notice 
the problem." 7 I, however, believe that I have found a reasonable solution to 
the problem that is not only consistent with Stoic texts and provides a plausible 
account for animal behavior, but also sheds light on several related issues in 
Stoic logic and grammar.
5 Sorabji (1990), pp. 307, 309.
6 Rubarth (1997), pp. 229-232.
7 Lesses (1997), p. 23.
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II. The Stoics on perceptual content
The Stoics explained mental events in terms of phantasiai, that is, 
mental appearances or impressions. A phantasia can be formed either directly 
by the senses (aisthetic phantasia) or by the manipulation of previously 
experienced phantasiai. Phantasiai are also categorized according to the 
agent. Diodes of Magnesia reports that the Stoics held that some phantasiai 
are rational (logikai), and some are non-rational (alogoi). The rational 
phantasiai are those that belong to rational animals (human beings, gods), and 
the non-rational phantasiai are those that belong to non-rational anim als.8 
The passage adds that rational phantasiai are thoughts or noêseis, while non- 
rational phantasiai have no distinctive nam e.9
This definition, however, does not tell us what it means for phantasiai to 
be rational (logikai). We are told that the rational phantasiai are thoughts, but 
it is not clear how to translate the term noêsis without begging the question. 
Sextus Empiricus tells us that a noêsis is something different than perception, 
since perception and experience are conditions for noêseis.1® But knowing 
what it is not is not the same as knowing what it is. Certainly, there must be a 
qualitative difference corresponding to the species-identification. Sextus 
Empiricus provides additional information. He states:
λεκτόν δέ ΰττάρχειν φασί τό κατά λογικήν φαντασίαν υφιστάμενον, 
λογικήν δέ είναι φαντασίαν καθ’ ήν τό φαντασθέν έστι λόγερ 
τταραστησαι.
They [the Stoics] say that a 'sayable' [λέκτον] is what subsists in 
accordance with a rational impression, and a rational impression is one 
in which the content of the impression can be exhibited in language. H
Diogenes Laertes also links the rational phantasia with the lekton.12 it is 
usually inferred from these texts that what distinguishes the rational and non-
8 As modem reader we most likely question the dichotomy of rational and 
non-rational animals. We tend to see a gradation of rationality in the world. 
The Stoics, however, took the dichotomy very seriously. In fact, Diodes of 
Magnesia uses the dichotomy between rational and non-rational animals as an 
example indicating the proper use of diairesis (D.L. VH.61).
9 D.L VII.51. It is not immediately clear if these definitions demand that all 
phantasiai in rational animals be thoughts or whether they are simply saying 
that thoughts are the characteristic form of mental experience in rationed 
animals. Long (1971) states  ^ "'Rational presentations' are thoughts (noêseis) 
and peculiar to men, though it is not, I think, implied that every species of 
human phantasia is logikê" (p. 83). Annas (1992) argues that there "are no 
perceptions which do not involve conceptualization and thinking" (p. 78). 
Kerferd (1978) argues, "It is clearly implied that this distribution is complete -- 
thus all human phantasiai are logikai... and as such are noêseis?' (p. 253).
10 SVFII. 8 8.
H Adv. Math VIII.70 (= SVF 11.187) Long and Sedley correctly translate λόγερ 
as "in language" and not "by reason" (cf. Bury, Loeb edition). The Stoic 
definition for λόγος is "φεονή σημαντική άπό διανοίας εκπεμπομένη, οΐον 
Ήμερα εστί" (D.L VÏÏ.56).
12 "το κατά φαντασίαν λογικήν ύφιστάμενον," D.L VIL63. See Frede (1994a).
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rational phantasia is that the former entails a subsisting lekton or "sayable' 
and that the latter do not. Sorabji objects that the text does not actually say 
that lekta subsists only with rational phantasiai, and that the text may be 
presenting a sufficient condition for the lekta and not a necessary condition. 
In other words, a lekton is what subsists with a rational phantasia, but it also 
subsists with non-rational phantasiai. This would not be the natural reading 
of the text. I know of no other case of a Stoic text where the expression 
rational phantasia is used to refer to phantasiai in general. Clearly these texts 
are specifying the phantasia to make a point: a lekton subsists with a rational 
phantasia but not with a non-rational phantasia. Sorabji must appeal to the 
unnatural reading since he is dissatisfied with what he believes are the 
implications. I am presenting an interpretation wherein we can save both the 
text and the phenomena.
III. Perceptual content and Lekta
It is clear, then, that the rational phantasia is intimately tied to the 
lekton, and hence to Stoic grammar and logic. A better understanding of the 
lekton will therefore be useful here. A lekton is sometimes identified as a 
"meaning", but more accurately, a lekton is something said or something that 
can be said, hence, a ’sayable’ in Long and Sedley parlance. The lekton can be 
most easily represented by examining intentional content of a truth-claim 
[άξίοομα]. I am avoiding translating άξίομα as "proposition" lest we confuse 
this sense of proposition with Sorabji’s use of the term. To understand a lekton, 
one needs to understand its structure. Lekta are said to be either complete or 
incomplete. The basic structure of a complete lekton consists of a subject and 
a predicate. In the case of a propositions or truth-claims [άξιώματα], it is this 
structure that allows lekta to be the bearers of truth; incomplete lekta such as 
predicates alone carry no truth value. The predicate "is running" is neither 
true nor false. The same follows for a non-predicated subject such as "the 
dog." Truth claims can only be found in complete lekta.: "A dog is running" 
is either true or false.
The traditional position is that human beings think linguistically. Our 
thoughts share a common syntax with our speech. While it may be possible 
that certain human phantasiai are non-linguistic, our phantasiai are 
characteristically linguistic. Just as animals do not share the capacity of 
speech, they do not share the linguistic syntax in their perceptions and 
sensory impressions.
The idea that rational creatures think linguistically, of course, need not 
mean that we think and perceive in words. Though the language of thought 
has a linguistic structure, it does not follow that thoughts must be internal 
verbalizations. The propositional structure of language and thinking rests on 
a specific syntax: the subject and predicate relation within an epistemological 
context. All propositional attitudes require this syntax at least minimally. We 
think and perceive that certain things are the case. Animals as non-rational 
creatures, the orthodox view argues, must then think non-propositionally and 
hence cannot have propositional attitudes.
Richard Sorabji objects to this interpretation of the difference between 
rational and non-rational phantasiai on several grounds. As we have seen, his
13 See Frede (1994b) for a discussion of whether a subject of a predication 
contains an incomplete lekton.
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main concern is that this view would substantially weaken the Stoic theory's 
ability to explain the phenomena of animal behavior. His generosity to the 
Stoics is admirable. Certainly the Stoics were no fools. As perhaps the greatest 
logical minds of their day, we should be suspicious of an interpretation that 
flounders while dealing with fundamental phenomena such as animal 
behavior. However, for Sorabji to "save" Stoic philosophy of mind he must 
first get around the lekta issue.
If Sorabji is right that animals do hold propositional beliefs, it would 
follow that lekta would subsist with these beliefs. Even if we grant him that 
the subsistence of lekta with rational phantasiai is a sufficient condition and 
not a necessary condition for a lekta, thereby opening the door to lekta also 
subsisting with non-rational, animal phantasiai, we still have another 
problem: If animals cannot speak, how can their thoughts contain lekta or 
'sayables'? Sorabji responds that a lekta need not be verbalized but just 
verbalizable. This is a point with which most of his opponents would agree 
since we frequently think without speaking (as well as the converse which 
tends to get us into trouble). But this in itself does not take Sorabji far enough; 
for propositions are neither verbalized nor verbalizable by animals. He 
therefore suggests that the lekton may not even need to be verbalizable by the 
agent but verbalizable by a rational agent. 14 Hence, it may be sufficient that 
the thoughts can be verbalized in principle or that their thought can be 
verbalized by us.
I don't find this position helpful. 15 What would it mean for me to 
verbalize or have the capacity to verbalize the thoughts of another species? 
First of all I question whether I could, even in principle have access to the 
thought of another species outside of observing its behavior and imagining 
what I would think if I behaved like the animal. Nagel is very germane here. 
In principle my access to an animal's thoughts, what ever that means, would 
not be the same as its experience of its own thoughts. Davidson makes a lot of 
sense here since he recognizes that there is no such thing as an isolated 
thought. Thoughts derive their very meaning from their epistemologically 
rich context. Every though acquires its meaning in relation to the universe of 
a wider range of thoughts and experience. Thus an animal's thought in my 
mind wouldn't be the same as in its own mind.
14 (1990) p.311.
15 In fact the argument seems to beg the question. The issue at hand is the 
nature and structure of animal thought and whether it is propositional or not. 
To say that an animal's thoughts are verbalizable in principle seems to be 
saying that i f  a rational agent could understand or access animal 
consciousness, it would be able to articulate it. This begs the questions since 
the possibility of a rational agent comprehending an irrational animal's mind 
is the very issue under investigation. I agree with Nagel that to do such an 
operation would not be informing us what it is to be (or think like) a bat but 
what it is like for us to imagine ourselves as a bat. My argument is that there 
may be no translation matrix between irrational and irrational agents since 
the very structure and grammar of thinking are on the Stoic model 
fundamentally different, cf. Quine (1969). The challenge to my position is, as 
Sorabji points out, how to account for simple animal behavior without 
attributing propositional attitudes (and without having recourse to modem 
alternatives such as the Churchland kind of eliminative materialism, which 
depends so heavily on a scientific context wholly unknown to the Stoics.
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Davidson’s position here fits nicely with the Stoic concept of the 
hegemonikon and the Stoic theory of perception. The hegemonikon may be a 
blank slate at birth but after the first impression the writing surface has its 
own texture and content. Thus no subsequent phantasia ever strikes a blank 
surface (I am speaking in metaphor here). Thus no two perceivers will ever 
see the same sense-object in exactly the same way. The object may be the 
same, but the memories, experiences, values, and other phantasiai are all 
written and preserved in the hegemonikon so that the newly imprinted 
phantasia will have subject-specific content which is define in part by the 
personal history of the agent.
Here I've been speaking primarily of two members of the same species. 
The issue gets much more complicated when comparing different species who 
by definition have different kinds of phantasiai. A rational animal and a non- 
rational animal will not only have such radically different histories and 
background to make verbalization in principle impossible, but in addition they 
will have a different sort of grammar which delineates the two major kinds of 
phantasiai.16
It seems then that saying that a non-rational phantasia may have a 
lekton on the basis that it might be verbalized in principle or that their 
thought can be verbalized by us is not a feasible solution to Sorabji's attempt to 
save the phenomenon of animal behavior.
IV. A new solution to the old problem
In this final section I will argue how we can make sense of the Stoic 
position on animal perception without representing the Stoic theory of animal 
behavior as inane and implausible. First let me reiterate my basic position: I 
argue that according to the Stoics animals do not have what we would call 
propositional attitudes. How then can I account for a dog's behavior when it 
follows the scent of a hare? Surely it the dog believes that it is hungry, that 
the hare is tasty, and that if he follows its scent it will lead him to the hare, 
thereby satisfying its hunger. Moreover, my solution is not to return to the 
worn-out "thinking that" versus "thinking as" paradigm. Sorabji is correct 
that the distinction is not always clear in contemporary thought and that 
there is no indication that it would be a likely tact for the Stoics. Therefore, I 
need an alternative theory that finds that coveted middle ground which saves 
both the text and the phenomena. My reconstruction will be sufficient to 
account for animal behavior without attributing to them a mental syntax and 
epistemological framework characteristic of experienced language-users.
The main weakness in Sorabji's argument is that he conflates 
predication, proposition, and connectivity. He argues that even the most basic 
animal behavior connects presentations and thoughts, such as when an 
animal perceives a scent coming from a certain direction. He states:
But this already involves predication: the scent is connected with a 
direction. We can put this by saying that the animal has the perceptual 
appearance that the scent comes from that direction, or the perceptual 
appearance of it as coming from there (these are not sharply 
distinguished by the Stoics). I shall describe such appearances as *6
16 I will support this last claim in the next section.
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propositional, meaning no more than that one thing is predicated of 
another. I7
This, however, is overworking the concept of predication. Whereas 
predication is a kind of connection, not all connection entails predication. I 
will return to this point shortly.
The Stoics cannot deny that animals perceive things in relation to each 
other things (e.g. the scent coming from that direction). The dog must 
minimally connect the scent a direct if we are to explain the animal following 
an animal's trail. And it is also true that if the animal is to act on a stimulus it 
must connect the stimulus with a desire or experience. The dog must connect 
the scent with its desire or hunger. However, I do not agree that the animal 
must believe that the scent is coming from a given direction or even believe 
that it is hungry (though that is how we would interpret and articulate the 
grumbling and sensation from our stomach i f  we dogs). But by Sorabji’s 
account the connection implies predication which in turn implies, 
syntactically, a proposition, hence the "that-clause" and his view that animals 
must have propositional attitudes.
Sorabji fails to recognize that connectivity need not imply predication. 
Predication is a certain kind of connection. Indeed, the most obvious example 
of non-predicative connectivity comes from the Greek language, something 
that the Stoics as grammarians would certainly be familiar with. I refer to the 
distinction between the predicate and attributive position in Greek grammar. 
An adjective in the predicate positions affirms that something is the case of its 
subject: "The rabbit is tasty" (ό Accycoç ήδϋ$). However, if the adjective is 
placed in the attributive position the result is simple connection or 
description: "Tasty hare" (ό ήδϋς λαγώς ). "Tasty hare" is not a complete 
lekton by Stoic standards since it is a modified subject without a predicate. It is 
therefore not a proposition and contains no truth claim.
But is the attributive syntax sufficient to describe animal behavior?
Let's return to the dog and the prey example. The dog has the experience of 
hunger. It does not know that it is hungry, it simply is hungry. In other 
words, an impulse is present. The dog also has a memory (and/or possibly an 
innate impulse) of hunger-satisfaction connected with a hare. The hare- 
memory is also connected to a certain scent. This is not the same as saying that 
the dog knows that hares smell like this. The hare and the scent simply 
accompany each other. The scent then is connected with a direction. The dog 
then connects its hunger with the direction (along with the residual 
associations of the hare). This connection or association, without predication 
suggesting a truth value, is sufficient for the animal to pursue its prey. The 
Stoic theory of impulse should be able to get the dog moving. 19
How then does this differ from Sorabji's position? Does it not still imply 
that the animal has a belief? In my theory the dog does not believe anything
17 (1990) p. 307.
IS It is also important to remember here that truth-claims (άξιώματα) are 
not the only kind of lekta. Questions, commands, and oaths are also lekta. 
While these are not truth-claims, they do imply and require a predicational 
framework and propositional attitudes to operate.
19 The relationship between perceptual content and impulse is outside of the 
scope of this paper and is not the problem that I am presently trying to solve. 
This subject requires much more attention. See Inwood, 1985.
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to be the case since no predication has been made. Instead, the dog has a 
collection or cluster of memories and associations. The animal's attributive- 
thought associates memories and experiences without reference to an 
validating epistemological framework. The propositional thought 
characteristic of human beings, on the other hand, embodies a truth claim. As 
a complete lekta, it bears a truth value. The issue is not verbalizability in itself 
but the presence of a syntax that suggest a condition of fulfillment in an 
epistemologically rich context. Animals simply have no such syntax and no 
such epistemological context. Therefore, nothing is either true or false for an 
animal.
Let's take one more look at the issue from the epistemological angle. A 
propositional thought presents a claim in the context of a coherent and rich 
world-picture which creates conditions of fulfillment. Propositions entail the 
possibility of error; propositional thinking likewise recognizes the conception 
of truth (at least tacitly). The non-rational, attributive experience 
characteristic of animal thinking, however, is immediate and does not declare 
a relation outside of the immediacy; it is epistemologically neutral. If a dog 
has a phantasia cluster of a "tasty-hare" and hunts down the prey only to find 
a porcupine, the tasty-hare phantasia would be replaced by the prickly-hare 
phantasia. If a residual memory of the "tasty-hare" remains it might sniff 
around some more. Eventually a more pressing phantasia will replace it such 
as the "tasty-squirrel" phantasia in another tree. The important thing is not 
that the dog, as far as we can tell, will not face any epistemological crisis as a 
rational animal exercising predicative thinking would. Instead the perception 
and its entailing expectation is replaced by a new immediacy. The question of 
truth is not implicit in the claim or even within the cognitive vocabulary of 
the animal. This is why it is so important that we avoid using "it is the case" or 
"that" language when speaking of animal phantasiaL I argue that the Stoics 
knew better and that Sorabji's interpretation does not save the Stoics but 
undermines an important insight regarding animal psychology and 
epistemology.
This takes us back to Nagel. We want to know what it is like to be a dog 
chasing a hare. Nagel warns us of the difficulties and limitations of simply 
extending our concepts and forms of thinking to animal behavior. That would 
only tell us what it would like if we were dogs chasing hares. We cannot 
imagine thinking without our own conceptual language, void of an 
epistemologically rich context. The Stoics, however, seemed to have realized 
the implications of denying animals reason. It means that animal thought is 
but analogous2^  to human thought and does not even have a name (ou 
tetuchêkasin onomatos)21 it also means that animals have no concept of truth 
or falsehood. They may run into conflicting associations and memories but 
they do not have the cognitive capabilities, at least according to the Stoic 
model, to determine the truth, and recognize it as such. This last fact may 
explain why my dog Max never seemed startled when I performed magic tricks 
in front of him. He seemed far more interested in the rabbit that I pulled out 
of the hat than the fact that it appeared to come from an empty hat.
20 Chrysippus' "dialectical Dog" is explicitly said not to reason but to do 
something analogous. All interpretations, including Sorabji's, faces a problem 
with the dialectical dog. If Sorabji's interpretation is correct then there is no 
reason to claim that what the dog does not actual reason by only does 
something analogous.
21 D.LVII.51
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